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GOVERNMENT RECOVERY OF MEDICARE
OVERPAYMENTS AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY
ABSTRACT
The automatic stay in bankruptcy is in place to protect the debtor’s fresh
start and discourage creditors from pursuing their own collection efforts outside
of the equitable distribution bankruptcy contemplates. In healthcare
bankruptcies, the automatic stay is not always applied consistently, especially
for the largest creditor in these cases, the government.
The government, through its agencies, decides whether it will require the
bankrupt healthcare provider to repay any Medicare overpayments the agency
has previously made. During bankruptcy and the automatic stay, government
agencies continue to demand and collect repayments from healthcare entities,
allowing the government to jump other creditors based on the equitable doctrine
of recoupment.
Recoupment is a non-statutory doctrine recognized by bankruptcy courts as
a means for creditors to offset their debts against payments, but recoupment is
similar to setoff, an action that is stayed under the Bankruptcy Code. This
Comment argues that government agencies should not be allowed to continue
repayment actions against healthcare entities that will jeopardize their
reorganization process during bankruptcy. This Comment suggests that courts
can fix this issue by narrowly applying the doctrine of recoupment and reducing
the circumstances in which government agencies can collect from bankrupt
healthcare entities without seeking relief from the automatic stay.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was
passed with the goal of decreasing healthcare costs and increasing the quality of
patient care.1 The ACA is the most comprehensive healthcare law passed in
recent times, making health law one of the fastest-growing fields in the legal
profession. Many people understand the new healthcare reforms affecting
individuals, such as the individual mandate and preexisting condition
limitations. However, most people are unaware of the greater impact that the
ACA and other federal healthcare regulations have on healthcare providers and
their ability to deliver services and conduct business.
Since the passage of the ACA, healthcare entities have been subject to
numerous new regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”).2 Some of these regulations closely monitor the
quality of care the public receives by requiring healthcare providers to report
quality and readmission rates to determine “winners and losers” in the healthcare
system.3 When healthcare providers report these factors, patients can make more
informed decisions about their providers, and the government can determine
which entities are efficiently spending government funds.4
In this “winner-loser” system, more healthcare entities will be pushed into
bankruptcy by consumers or the government.5 When healthcare entities file for
bankruptcy, they will likely find that the goals of bankruptcy and healthcare
regulations frequently clash.6 Although healthcare regulations seek to provide
efficient health services to citizens, a goal of bankruptcy is to reorganize
businesses to allow for creditor recovery on debts.7 A common issue that could
have a drastic effect on healthcare entities is receiving necessary Medicare
payments from the government during bankruptcy. The Medicare system
operates by estimating the amount of reimbursement the healthcare provider

1

See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
See ABI HEALTH CARE INSOLVENCY MANUAL 11 (Leslie Ann Berkoff, Bobby Guy, Timothy Lupinacci
& Clifford Zucker eds., 3d ed. 2012).
3
See Symposium, Corporate Bankruptcy Panel–The Healthcare Industry Post-Affordable Care Act: A
Bankruptcy Perspective, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 252 (2015); Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linkingquality-to-payment.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
4
See Linking Quality to Payment, supra note 3.
5
See Symposium, supra note 3, at 252.
6
See Deryck A. Palmer & Michele J. Meises, Collision Course between Bankruptcy and Health Care
Laws: Which Will Ultimately Control?, 1999 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 1.
7
See id.
2
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should receive from servicing Medicare recipients.8 This estimation process
often leads to overpayments that the government must recover from the
provider.9 When a healthcare entity files for bankruptcy, HHS’s Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) frequently argues that it may
continue to seek repayments from healthcare entities for the excess funds it
provided prior to the bankruptcy.10 Healthcare providers question whether these
recovery actions are violations of the automatic stay under § 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code).11
Alternatively, CMS utilizes the non-statutory doctrine of recoupment as a
permissible way to recover debts from future payments. Because courts allow
recoupment of debts made during the same transaction as an equitable remedy,
CMS regularly argues that recovery of Medicare overpayments during
bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay.12 However, Medicare payments
are vital to the survival of the majority of healthcare providers.13 Taking
prepetition payments back from these providers after they filed for bankruptcy
strips them of assets needed for reorganization, and even forces some hospitals
to close their doors.14 Unfortunately, courts have yet to resolve whether the
automatic stay applies to these recovery actions by the government.15
The split in judicial opinions hinges on whether Medicare payments and
Medicare overpayment recovery actions are considered to be within the “same
transaction.”16 If overpayment recovery actions are considered separate
transactions from Medicare payments, CMS’s recovery actions fall under the
definition of setoff and are subject to the automatic stay.17 On the other hand, if
Medicare payments and overpayment recovery efforts are considered to be

8

ABI, supra note 2, at 14–15; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012).
See ABI, supra note 2, at 15.
10
See Palmer, supra note 6.
11
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); see Palmer, supra note 6.
12
See Palmer, supra note 6.
13
See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Medicare Pays Almost Half of Rural Hospital Stays: AHRQ
News and Numbers, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY (Jan. 28, 2010), https://archive.
ahrq.gov/news/newsroom/news-and-numbers/012810.html.
14
See, e.g., Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1071 (3d Cir. 1992); In
re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160, 164 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014); In re Tidewater Mem’l Hosp., Inc.,
106 B.R. 876, 879 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
15
See Ted A. Berkowitz & Veronique A. Urban, Medicare Issues in Bankruptcies, 31 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 28 (2012).
16
See, e.g., In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
17
11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. 95, 100 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (stating that
recovery efforts for obligations arising out of separate transactions are considered setoff and subject to the
provisions of the automatic stay).
9
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within the same transaction, the equitable doctrine of recoupment allows
overpayment recovery without implicating the automatic stay.18 Five federal
circuits and several bankruptcy courts have addressed this specific issue by
analyzing the “same transaction” distinction.19
When courts determine that the government’s post-petition recovery efforts
should be exempt from the automatic stay solely based on their understanding
of “same transaction,” courts are ignoring the unique nature of the healthcare
industry and its regulatory system. In contrast, the minority view implements a
test that considers other factors relevant to the rules of construction and public
policy when determining the appropriate definition of “same transaction”: the
“single integrated transaction test.” In turn, this Comment proposes that courts
adopt the minority approach by utilizing the single integrated transaction test
and considering the public policy issues that specifically affect healthcare
providers.
First, this Comment will discuss the conflicting provisions of Medicare law
and bankruptcy law that courts must resolve. Next, this Comment will compare
the tests that circuits have used to resolve the issue of Medicare overpayment
recovery within bankruptcy. Finally, this Comment will advocate for the
minority approach to this issue by highlighting the appropriateness of limiting
the equitable doctrine of recoupment, looking to CMS’s accounting practices to
evaluate separate transactions, and considering the public policy implications
for healthcare providers in bankruptcy.
BACKGROUND
In general, conflicts occur when the government attempts to regulate the
healthcare system in the United States.20 Healthcare laws and regulations seek
to protect the public health by providing efficient services, but also regulate the
costs and availability of services for all Americans.21 The conflicting policies in
health law are of particular concern when a healthcare organization files for
bankruptcy.22 While one goal of bankruptcy is to allow equitable recovery for

18

See In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. at 100.
See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1072; United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am.,
Inc., 108 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011; In re Holyoke Nursing Home,
Inc., 372 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2005); see also
Berkowitz, supra note 15.
20
See ABI, supra note 2, at 3.
21
See id.
22
See id.
19
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creditors, another goal is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.23 Chapter 11 of
the Code provides entities with the opportunity to cure their financial issues
while staying in business by reorganizing the business and debts.24 The conflict
between health law and bankruptcy is heightened when the government operates
as both a regulator of the public health system and a creditor within the
bankruptcy system.
A. Medicare
As one of the largest national healthcare programs, Medicare laws and
regulations will frequently affect healthcare entities inside and outside of
bankruptcy.25 Title XVIII of the Social Security Act established the Medicare
program to provide health insurance coverage for the elderly.26 Medicare
provides this benefit by paying the cost of certain health services for eligible
citizens.27 Under the Medicare system, healthcare entities enter into “provider
agreements” with Medicare’s administrating agency, CMS, to be reimbursed for
the cost of services rendered to Medicare-covered patients.28 The provider
agreements require healthcare entities to agree to certain terms and abide by
regulations as a condition of participating in the Medicare program.29 CMS
employs a prospective payment system (“PPS”) as a method to reimburse
entities prior to incurring the costs for their services.30 Under the PPS, CMS
estimates the costs the healthcare provider will incur based on predetermined
amounts for various types of entities.31

23

See W. HOMER DRAKE & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 1.1 (2d ed.

2017).
24

See id.
Harvey L. McCormick, 1 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROC. § 1:1 (4th ed.).
26
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012); 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L.
& PRAC. § 119:5 (3d ed. 2008).
27
Medicare covers people ages 65 and over, people under age 65 with certain disabilities, and people of
all ages with End-Stage Renal Disease. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Program General Information, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/Medicare
GenInfo/index.html (last modified July 25, 2014). Also, certain individuals may be subject to other eligibility
requirements depending on whether they are covered under Part A, B, C, or D. Health services covered depend
on whether the individual is under Part A, B, C, or D. See ABI, supra note 2, at 3.
28
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare General Information, Eligibility, and
Entitlement § 10.1 CMS.GOV (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/
Manuals/downloads/ge101c05.pdf; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012).
29
Eligibility and Entitlement, supra note 28.
30
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Prospective Payment Systems – General Information,
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/prospmedicarefeesvcpmtgen/
CMS.GOV,
index.html (last modified May 19, 2015).
31
42 C.F.R. § 413.64 (2017); Prospective Payment Systems, supra note 30.
25
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Since these payments are based on estimates, CMS must reconcile the
payments with the actual amount due to the provider from actual services
rendered and costs accumulated at the end of the accounting period.32 If CMS
determines there has been an overpayment, a fiscal intermediary, acting on
behalf of CMS, sends out an initial demand letter to the provider notifying them
of the overpayment and requesting repayment or offering the option to enter into
a repayment arrangement with reduced or suspended future payments.33 If the
provider does not respond to the demand letter within 15 days, the fiscal
intermediary may begin subtracting the amount owed from current or future
payments to providers.34
In the alternative, the provider may appeal the overpayment demand or
request that recovery be waived.35 This response may temporarily pause the
recovery process pending the determination of the appeal or waiver.36 The
appeals process consists of five levels of review, beginning with redetermination
by the fiscal intermediary up to judicial review by a federal district court.37 This
lengthy process can lead to years of appeals, and burdens the provider to produce
evidence at each stage.38 If the provider is unable to prove its claim at any point
during the appeals process, CMS may resume recovering overpayments.39
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In
re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC,40 the healthcare entity must follow CMS’s
administrative review process before courts are allowed to review the
appropriateness of CMS’s recovery efforts, even for entities in bankruptcy.41
CMS only allows limited exceptions for entities who file for bankruptcy.42

32

42 C.F.R. § 413.60 (2017); ABI, supra note 2, at 15.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Financial Management Manual, Ch. 3, § 20.1,
CMS.GOV (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/
fin106c03.pdf.
34
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Overpayment Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV (Oct.
2016),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/
downloads/OverpaymentBrochure508-09.pdf.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Parts A & B Appeals Process Fact Sheet,
CMS.GOV (May 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNProducts/Downloads/MedicareAppealsProcess.pdf.
39
Id.
40
In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016).
41
Id. at 1314.
42
See Medicare Financial Management Manual, supra note 33, at Ch. 3, § 140.
33
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When a healthcare entity files for bankruptcy, CMS continues to assert its
power to recover overpayments for reimbursements made prior to bankruptcy.43
Healthcare entities have argued that certain provisions of the Code prohibit
CMS’s recovery actions after the entity has filed for bankruptcy.44 Such
healthcare entities are willing to fight the government over their Medicare
payments because receiving those payments could be the difference between
surviving the bankruptcy process or being forced to close its doors.
B. Bankruptcy Code
Though healthcare is a unique industry consisting of both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, the majority of these entities file for bankruptcy under
chapter 11.45 Chapter 11 allows the debtor to continue operating the business
while developing a plan to reorganize and rehabilitate it.46 As a general principle,
bankruptcy seeks to provide collective creditor relief through staying individual
creditor actions.47 Section 362 of the Code provides that filing a petition for
bankruptcy triggers the automatic stay.48 The automatic stay “gives [the]
bankrupt a breathing spell from creditors by stopping all collection efforts, all
harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”49 It also serves the purpose of
“permit[ting] [the] bankrupt to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or
simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove [it] into bankruptcy.”50
Section 362(a) stays all collection efforts, including “the setoff of any debt
owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title against any claim against the debtor.”51 Setoff is further discussed under
§ 553 of the Code.52 Setoff is defined as “any right of a creditor to offset a mutual
debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the bankruptcy case against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.”53 Under § 553,

43
44
45
46

See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1070; In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 3.
6 NORTON, supra note 26.
Nancy A. Peterman, Introduction, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 91:1 (3d ed.

2017).
47

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 2012.
49
Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991).
50
Id.
51
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2012).
52
Id. § 553.
53
5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. DICT. OF BANKR.
TERMS § S90 (3d ed. 2017).
48
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creditors are allowed to offset debts, subject to the limitations given in §§ 553,
362, and 363.54 Because the automatic stay limits creditors’ setoff rights,
creditors must seek relief from the automatic stay through the bankruptcy courts
before asserting these rights.55
Though setoff efforts are not exempt from the automatic stay, subsection (b)
of 11 U.S.C. § 362 discusses certain exceptions to the automatic stay.56
Specifically, § 362(b)(4) provides an exception for actions by a government unit
or organization enforcing its police or regulatory power.57 This exception applies
to government agencies like CMS, but courts have concluded that it does not
apply when the government agency is seeking to enforce contractual rights, such
as those based on obligations under the Medicare provider agreements.58
According to legislative history, this exception should only apply “where a
governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such law.”59 In
University Medical Center v. Sullivan,60 where HHS withheld post-petition
Medicare payments from a bankrupt hospital because of past overpayments, the
Third Circuit concluded that withholding Medicare payments was not within
HHS’s regulatory power, and these actions were not exempt from the automatic
stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).61
Additionally, in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Congress amended § 362(b) to include an additional
exception for the Secretary of HHS for actions excluding debtors from Medicare
and other federal healthcare programs.62 This provision was specifically enacted
to combat Medicare fraud by providers.63 Based on the language and underlying
legislative history of this exception, it can be understood to only apply to
decisions on whether to terminate provider agreements for fraudulent reasons or
penalties, but courts have not applied this exception for actions to recover
54

11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).
United States ex. rel. I.R.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 771 (3d Cir. 1983).
56
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2012).
57
Id. § 362(b)(4).
58
See In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d 440, 445 (1st Cir.
1986); In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1075 (3d Cir. 1992).
59
In re Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d at 445 (citing H.R.Rep.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977)).
60
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065.
61
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1075.
62
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(28) (2012).
63
143 Cong. Rec. E1739-02 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1997) (statement of Rep. Stark).
55
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overpayments. Even with these changes to § 362 of the Code, none of them have
been sufficient to clear up the specific issue healthcare entities face when CMS
seeks to elude the automatic stay to recover overpayments.
C. Equitable Doctrine of Recoupment
As an alternative means of offsetting debt, courts have established the
equitable doctrine of recoupment.64 Recoupment is defined as “[a] counterclaim
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the one on which the original
action is based.”65 While recoupment is not a doctrine solely limited to
bankruptcy cases,66 it allows creditors within the bankruptcy context to assert
certain mutual claims that would not be allowed through setoff because of its
statutory limitations.67 Courts allow recoupment when the setoff limitations
would lead to inequitable results.68 A court may also allow a claim for
recoupment if the creditor’s claim arises from the same transaction as a debtor’s
claim because the creditor’s claim can then be seen as a counterclaim or defense
rather than its own, separate debt obligation.69 This is evidenced by the
allowances in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure liberalized the process of
asserting counterclaims,70 those changes contributed to some confusion around
recoupment. Recoupment seems to fall under the definition of a compulsory
counterclaim that the party must plead or waive because the claim would be of
the same subject matter as the other party’s claim.71 In contrast, setoff, which
arises from a different transaction, would fall under the definition of a
permissive counterclaim and is not required to be plead in the party’s answer.72
A setoff is limited by the automatic stay, but recoupment is not subject to this

64
See United States ex. rel. U.S. Postal Service v. Dewey Freight System, Inc., 31 F.3d 620, 622–23 (8th
Cir. 1994).
65
Recoupment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
66
Dewey Freight System, Inc., 31 F.3d at 622.
67
ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 8.07
(5th ed. 2016).
68
See id.
69
See Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
70
Craig H. Averch & Blake L. Berryman, Getting Out of the Code: When Equitable Remedies Obtain
Priority over General Unsecured Claims, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 285, 290 (1996).
71
See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
72
See In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944).
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limitation.73 Based on the courts’ discretion, recoupment has been allowed and
rejected in various cases.74
The primary limitation on recoupment is the requirement that the claims
arise from the same transaction.75 If the claims arise out of the same transaction,
the creditor’s claims are considered recoupments, and the creditor’s postpetition actions are not stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362.76 If the claims arise from
separate transactions, actions to recover debt are considered setoff and are stayed
under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) unless relief is granted by a bankruptcy court.77
Since there is no clear indicator of which claims are within the same transaction,
debtors and creditors have brought this issue to the courts.
D. Judicial Approaches to the “Same Transactions” Test
Various circuits have decided that the most important issue in determining
whether post-petition recovery efforts for certain claims will be considered
setoff or recoupment is whether the claims are part of the same transaction, but
these courts have not settled on one test for determining what qualifies as a single
transaction.78 Only five circuits have spoken to this issue, and decisions by
bankruptcy and district courts have varied.79 To determine whether the claims
are part of the same transaction, courts have come up with two tests: the single
integrated transaction test and the logical relationship test.80
1. Single Integrated Transaction Test
The single integrated transaction test provides a narrow approach for
determining what constitutes a single transaction.81 This approach states that
“both debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so that it would be
inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without also
73

In re LaPierre, 180 B.R. at 100.
See, e.g., In re Ross, 104 B.R. 171, 173–74 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (allowing government agency to recoup
prepetition overpayments of unemployment benefits from debtor); Lee, 739 F.2d at 876 (concluding that
government could not recoup prepetition overpayments of Social Security benefits because debt was subject to
limits on setoff).
75
GINSBERG, supra note 67.
76
Palmer, supra note 6, at 8.
77
See Berkowitz, supra note 15.
78
See, e.g., In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105; In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d
at 4; In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011; United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d
390; In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079; see also 6 WILLIAM, supra note 26.
79
6 WILLIAM, supra note 26, at § 119:8.
80
See Berkowitz, supra note 15.
81
See In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
74
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meeting its obligations.”82 The Third Circuit discussed this approach in
University Medical Center v. Sullivan, where HHS withheld Medicare
reimbursements from a hospital after discovering previous overpayments.83
There, University Medical Center (“UMC”) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and
was sent a demand letter from a fiscal intermediary informing the hospital of
Medicare overpayments from three years prior.84 As a result, HHS began
withholding payments from UMC.85 Although UMC attempted to enter into a
repayment plan, their efforts ultimately failed, and HHS resumed withholding
the entire amount of UMC’s Medicare reimbursements, forcing the hospital to
close.86
Prior to the Third Circuit’s holding, the bankruptcy court found for UMC
based on § 525(a) of the Code,87 stating that the government was unlawfully
discriminating against the debtor by conditioning future payments on repayment
of the past overpayments.88 In its decision, the bankruptcy court did not state
any distinctions between recoupment and setoff, but it concluded that the
government’s actions were a violation of the automatic stay.89 HHS appealed,
and the district court affirmed but based on a different rationale. The district
court rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding of discrimination,90 and instead
focused on the recoupment argument made by HHS. After assessing whether the
prepetition overpayment and post-petition payment arose from the same
transaction, the district court ruled that the two were separate transactions.91 The
district court’s decision pointed out that the provider agreement did not enable
HHS to enter into one transaction for recoupment purposes. The court also made
sure to examine the reconciliation process and other equitable concerns.92
Following that decision, both parties asked the district court to reconsider the
case, and the district court reaffirmed its decision for UMC.93 Though the district
court only reconfirmed its previous decision, it issued another opinion clarifying
its rationale. The district court explained the policy considerations behind
82

Id.
Id. at 1070.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2012).
88
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 93 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
89
Id.
90
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 122 B.R. 919, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
91
Id. at 929.
92
Id. at 930 (distinguishing In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986), where the equitable
concern was that the creditor mistakenly made a payment that was not required by a contract).
93
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 125 B.R. 121, 123 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
83
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disallowing HHS to recoup those overpayments and force hospitals into
bankruptcy or closure.94 The court also discussed the provider agreements being
an executory agreement subject to assumption.95
Even after three decisions, both parties appealed to the Third Circuit. The
Third Circuit, applying its strict single integrated transaction test, concluded that
HHS’s post-petition recovery actions were setoff efforts and therefore a
violation of the automatic stay.96 The Third Circuit explained that the ongoing
relationship between HHS and its Medicare providers did not sufficiently
support a finding that the payments and overpayment recovery efforts were one
transaction.97 After reviewing Medicare’s statutes and regulations, the Third
Circuit found Medicare’s reconciliation process, which provided for an annual
audit to reconcile the debts, supportive to show that overpayments from a
payment three years prior were not within the same transaction, and recoupment
was not appropriate.98
By using the single integrated transaction test, the Third Circuit stood behind
its previously stated belief that the equitable doctrine of recoupment should
narrowly construe what constitutes a single transaction.99 In a previous Third
Circuit case on recoupment, Lee v. Schweiker,100 the court articulated the idea
that “[t]he fact that the same two parties are involved, and that a similar subject
matter gave rise to both claims, however, does not mean that the two arose from
the ‘same transaction.’”101 After returning to this same statement in University
Medical Center, the Third Circuit further explained its rationale for prescribing
the single integrated transaction test by stating that exceptions to the automatic
stay based on recoupment should be narrowly construed because the doctrine is
not stated in the statute.102 The Third Circuit declined to agree that a “mere
logical relationship” is enough to establish that the claims arose from the same
transaction.103
94
See id. at 124 (“Under the Medicare reimbursement scheme, a provider that derives a substantial portion
of its revenue from Medicare patients might be indebted to HHS, through no fault of its own . . . . To allow HHS
to recoup this debt by completely withholding interim payments as they accrue, would place the hospital in a
stranglehold.”).
95
Id.
96
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1080.
97
Id. at 1081.
98
Id.
99
See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
100
Lee, 739 F.2d 870.
101
Id. at 875.
102
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081 (citing In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d at 158).
103
Id.
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2. Logical Relationship Test
A second approach used by courts to determine whether debts fall within the
same transaction is the logical relationship test. The logical relationship test
implements the broader approach rejected by the Third Circuit. The test states
“a ‘transaction’ may include ‘a series of many occurrences, depending not so
much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical
relationship.’”104 The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have employed this test to generally conclude that postpetition Medicare payments and prepetition overpayments are within the same
transaction, allowing the government to recoup these payments without running
afoul of the automatic stay.105
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was the first court
following University Medical Center to prescribe this alternative to the Third
Circuit’s test. In United States v. Consumer Health Service of America,106 the
D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of allowing the government to recover prepetition
Medicare overpayments from a home healthcare provider within bankruptcy.107
Prior to reaching the D.C. Circuit, the bankruptcy court ruled against HHS, citing
to the Third Circuit’s decision in University Medical Center.108
In the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, it never defined the “logical relationship test”
nor explicitly rejected the Third Circuit’s test.109 The D.C. Circuit explained its
belief that the overpayments and post-petition Medicare payments were part of
the same transaction based on its understanding of the Medicare statute, which
the D.C. Circuit felt the Third Circuit neglected to consider carefully.110 The
D.C. Circuit disagreed with the use of the healthcare entity’s annual audit as an
indicator because, in its view, timing is irrelevant to the determination.111
The court reasoned that even under the Third Circuit’s strict test, the
Medicare payments should be considered part of the same transaction because
the statute describes the Medicare reimbursements as one payment subject to

104

In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013 (quoting Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610

(1926)).
105
See In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 104; In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013; Consumer
Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395.
106
Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390.
107
Id. at 396.
108
United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 171 B.R. 917, 922 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994).
109
See Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
110
See Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 394; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012).
111
Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395.
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“necessary” deductions.112 Since the statute stated that the debtor could be paid
for its post-petition services minus “necessary” adjustments, the D.C. Circuit
sought to determine what Congress intended those adjustments to include.113
The D.C. Circuit recognized that “necessary” deductions could have meant those
sufficient to repay HHS for some overpayments without forcing the debtor into
financial difficulties.114 However, without finding any guidance from Congress,
the D.C. Circuit remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine the amount that
should be paid to Consumer Health.115 The D.C. Circuit’s statements on what
are considered “necessary” deductions brought even more ambiguity to the
confusing issue of recoupment of overpayments by rejecting HHS’s
interpretation of the term only to leave the lower courts to come up with their
own interpretation.
Following Consumer Health Services, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit in embracing the broader approach
to defining whether Medicare payments were within a single transaction. In In
re TLC Hospitals, Inc., the Ninth Circuit articulated its standard for what is now
known as the logical relationship test.116 In In re TLC Hospitals, Inc., HHS
attempted to deduct prepetition overpayments from post-petition
underpayments.117 At the bankruptcy court, the court allowed HHS to offset its
prepetition overpayments from the underpayments it owed the hospital but not
from the post-petition payments.118 The district court reversed, allowing HHS to
recover its prepetition overpayments from post-petition reimbursement
payments under recoupment.119 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing that
recovery of prepetition overpayments would not be allowed under the setoff
provisions of the Code but concluded that the overpayments and underpayments
could be recouped because they were within the “same transaction.”120 The
Ninth Circuit took a similar approach as the D.C. Circuit by reading the
Medicare statute and regulations as creating a billing system of payments that
“logically relate” to the same transaction.121 The Ninth Circuit also attempted to
make clear that this logical relationship test should be subject to some limits and

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d 1008.
Id. at 1010.
Id.
Sims v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 225 B.R. 709, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1011.
Id. at 1012.

GUICE_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

2017]

RECOVERY OF MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS

12/21/2017 2:03 PM

141

not so loosely applied that it would expand to cover “multiple occurrences in
any continuous commercial relationship.”122
In In re TLC Hospitals, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized a split between the
circuits by clearly stating that it joined the D.C. Circuit in its opinion and
disagreed with the Third Circuit.123 Similarly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit’s decisions in In re Holyoke Nursing Home124 and
In re Slater Health Center125 confirmed the First Circuit’s choice to follow the
D.C. and Ninth Circuit’s approach to interpreting “same transaction” under the
recoupment doctrine. In Holyoke, the Health Care Financing Administration
(“HCFA”)126 began withholding Medicare payments from Holyoke Nursing
Home after it filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.127 Holyoke commenced an
adversary proceeding against HCFA for violating the automatic stay.128 The
bankruptcy court and district court both found that HCFA’s actions were
permissible based on recoupment.129
A year later in Slater, the First Circuit again faced a case where Medicare
began withholding a portion of the bankrupt nursing home’s payments to recover
prepetition overpayments.130 In both Holyoke and Slater, the First Circuit held
that Medicare overpayments may be recouped without violating the automatic
stay.131 In Slater, the First Circuit cited to its decision in Holyoke as controlling
precedent and stated its decision to follow other circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit
and Ninth Circuit, in holding that recoupment is permissible in Medicare
overpayment cases.132 In Slater and Holyoke, the First Circuit explained that the
payments were part of a single transaction based on the continuous relationship
established by the Medicare provider agreements.133
The circuits that have addressed this issue seem to focus their decisions on
whether the government’s recovery actions will be stayed around the doctrines
122

Id.
See id. at 1013.
124
In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d 1.
125
In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105.
126
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was the prior title of the Department of Health and
Human Services’ (HHS) Medicare division. Health Care Finance Administration, FEDERAL REGISTER,
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-care-finance-administration (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
127
In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 2.
128
Id. at 3.
129
Id.
130
In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 99.
131
See In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 4; In re Slater Health Center, Inc., 398 F.3d at 105.
132
In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 103.
133
In re Holyoke Nursing Home, Inc., 372 F.3d at 4; In re Slater Health Ctr., Inc., 398 F.3d at 105.
123
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of setoff and recoupment. Courts attempt to employ recoupment as an equitable
means of allowing creditors to recover counterclaims.134 However, few courts
consider that setoff and recoupment essentially allow certain creditors to rise
above others, thereby disrupting bankruptcy’s goal of equal distribution to
creditors.135 The unique nature of healthcare entities in bankruptcy demands that
courts reconsider this doctrine.
II. DISCUSSION
This Comment will argue that courts should follow the minority approach in
University Medical Center v. Sullivan when determining whether government
actions to recover Medicare overpayments are subject to the automatic stay.
Following the single integrated transaction test to determine whether Medicare
payments and overpayments fall within the same transaction properly limits the
non-statutory doctrine of recoupment. This test also allows courts to consider
the unique nature of bankruptcy cases for healthcare entities and treats the
government equal to any other creditor when seeking to recover contractual
obligations.
A. Limitations on Recoupment
In University Medical Center, the court defines “recoupment” as “the setting
up of a demand arising from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim or cause
of action, strictly for the purpose of abatement or reduction of such claim.”136
Recoupment is not a doctrine discussed in the Code, but courts recognize it as
an equitable alternative to setoff.137 Recoupment began as a doctrine that
allowed parties to bring separate claims but adjudicate them together.138 This
doctrine held importance in many contexts, but modernly it is most important in
bankruptcy law.139
As discussed above, in bankruptcy, courts make determinations about
whether claims fall within the doctrine of recoupment by determining whether

134

See GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07.
See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875.
136
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.03, at 553-15-17 (L.
King, ed. 15th ed. 1991).
137
See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875 (stating that recoupment may be utilized when applying setoff limitations
would be inequitable).
138
In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d at 157 (describing the original doctrine of recoupment as “an equitable
rule of joinder.”).
139
See, e.g., id.
135
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they arise from the same transaction.140 While there are statutory limitations on
setoff,141 the “same transaction” requirement seems to be the only limitation
recognized for recoupment.142 Because equitable recoupment may allow
creditors to circumvent the automatic stay, the doctrine must be narrowly
construed to prevent abuse.143 It has been argued that recoupment, like setoff,
violates bankruptcy’s goal of fair and equal treatment of creditors,144 but courts
seem to continue allowing recoupment because of equity.145
1. Ambiguity of “Same Transaction”
The ambiguity around recoupment in bankruptcy contexts arises from a lack
of clarity on what constitutes the “same transaction.” The definition of setoff
discusses “mutual debts,” but these debts arise from different transactions.146 On
the other hand, the definition of recoupment requires that the claims arise from
the “same transaction.”147 Because of the similarities between setoff and
recoupment, courts may not specifically distinguish which of these remedies the
party is entitled to outside of the bankruptcy context.148 Often courts discuss
applying a test to determine whether claims arise from the same transaction, but
never state how such a test operates.149 The seemingly simple distinction
between the doctrines has sparked debate over the definition of the phrase “same
transaction” to determine when recoupment is applicable in bankruptcy cases.150
Prior to a specific statement of the doctrine of recoupment, the Supreme
Court discussed the definition of “transaction” in the context of counterclaims
in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.151 The Supreme Court stated that
transaction has a flexible meaning and that “[i]t may comprehend a series of
many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their
140

See Palmer, supra note 6, at 8.
See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
142
GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07.
143
James H. Wynn, Freeze and Recoupment: Methods for Circumventing the Automatic Stay?, 5 BANKR.
DEV. J. 85, 103 (1988).
144
See Cty. of Orange v. Cty. of Orange (In re Cty. of Orange), 183 B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995).
145
See BNY Fin. Corp. v. Masterwear Corp. (In re Masterwear Corp.), 229 B.R. 301, 311 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999).
146
See David G. Epstein & Jonathan A. Nockels, Recoupment: Apples, Oranges and Fruit Basket
Turnover, 58 SMU L. REV. 51, 54 (2005).
147
See generally id.
148
Id. at 54.
149
See, e.g., Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
150
GINSBERG, supra note 67, at § 8.07.
151
Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
141
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connection as upon their logical relationship.”152 With the Court only addressing
the definition of “transaction” in the context of general counterclaims and not
“same transaction” for the purpose of recoupment, it is unclear whether the same
definition should apply to a more specific doctrine like recoupment.153
In one of the earlier cases to mention recoupment, Bull v. United States,154
the Supreme Court gave a similarly vague definition of recoupment.155 The
Court stated recoupment as “a defense arising out of some feature of the
transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.”156 In a later Supreme
Court case discussing recoupment of a tax claim, the Court described a single
transaction for tax cases as “the taxable event claimed upon and the one
considered in recoupment.”157 Though the Court gives an unclear definition of
“single transaction,” it goes on to criticize the lower court for its broad
application of recoupment.158 The Court stated that the same transaction
requirement should be narrowly construed and limited recoupment in tax cases
to situations similar to the facts in Bull.159 The Second Circuit later stated that
recoupment should be even further limited in bankruptcy cases because of its
tendency to clash with bankruptcy’s goal of providing equal treatment for
creditors.160
The first time recoupment was applied in conjunction with bankruptcy law
was in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan.161 In Stanolind Oil & Gas, the district
court addressed a bankrupt oil company in an involuntary proceeding.162 The
bankruptcy proceedings involved a number of mineral leases on land in the
company’s estate, but the initial trustee found that these leases were unsalable.163
The estate was closed, but the debtor did not receive a discharge.164 Later, the
bankrupt company discovered oil on the land under these leases, and the
bankruptcy proceedings were reopened. The debtor had transferred a portion of
the lease to Stanolind, and Stanolind sought to stop the trustee from obtaining

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Epstein, supra note 146, at 64–65.
Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
See id. at 262.
Id.
Rothensies v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 (1946).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300–01.
See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1997).
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 30.
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possession of these leases and recovery of expenses Stanolind incurred from
developing the lease by arguing that the property had been abandoned.165
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with Stanolind’s abandonment argument but
agreed that Stanolind may offset their expenses against the value of the oil.166
The Fifth Circuit stated that the reimbursements Stanolind sought were a debt
due to the estate, and by seeking these expenses from the proceeds of the leases
and oil, Stanolind had a right to offset those debts.167 The Fifth Circuit found
these actions permissible under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 through the
equitable doctrines of setoff and recoupment.168 Once again, instead of
explaining each doctrine, the court stated setoff and recoupment as one doctrine
that courts may utilize to further equitable principles in bankruptcy cases.169 The
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Stanolind set a tone for other decisions that failed to
distinguish or set a standard for setoff and recoupment as separate doctrines.
Some courts and commentators argue that recoupment can be reconciled
with bankruptcy goals because the property the creditor seeks is not property of
the estate due to someone else holding an interest in the property.170 The Code
helps to resolve this ambiguity through its clear definitions of “claim” and
“property of the estate.” The Code defines “claim” as a “(A) right to payment”
or “(B) right to an equitable remedy.”171 Under § 541 of the Code, “property of
the estate” is described as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case.”172 Section 541 also makes clear
that “any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case” is also property of the estate.173 This section was included to make
clear that the debtor is still entitled to payment or benefits for the property and
services a debtor renders during the time after the bankruptcy case is
commenced.174 A decision by a New York bankruptcy court also confirmed the

165

Id.
Id. at 31–32.
167
Id. at 32.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d at 869; In re Career Consultants, Inc., 84 B.R. 419,
426 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Epstein, supra note 146, at 75.
171
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012).
172
Id. § 541(a)(1).
173
Id. § 541(a)(7).
174
See Peter R. Roest, Recovery of Medicare and Medicaid Overpayments in Bankruptcy, 10 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2001).
166
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idea that a right to recover an overpayment could be considered a
“dischargeable, contingent claim.”175
No one argues that setoff claims are not an attempt by the creditor to satisfy
a claim by obtaining property of the estate, which is covered by the automatic
stay.176 Since recoupment is such a similar doctrine, only distinguished by
whether the claims are from the same transaction, that minor difference should
not negate the claim as an equitable interest in the debtor’s property. Though
provisions of the Code speak to setoff and similar definitions, it does not change
that recoupment is not mentioned in the Code, and the non-statutory doctrine
must be interpreted by combining various sources.
2. Interpreting a Non-Statutory Doctrine
When considering an ambiguous term within a statute, courts may typically
consider congressional intent to determine its meaning.177 Unlike setoff,
recoupment is not addressed in the bankruptcy statute, and courts do not have
congressional guidance on this doctrine. While recoupment was discussed in the
bankruptcy context as early as the 1930s,178 Congress did not include
recoupment in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, or the BAPCPA.179 The
Bankruptcy Code of 1898 solely discussed “set-off” and did not mention
recoupment.180 In describing setoff, § 68 stated that “[i]n all cases of mutual
debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the
account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the
balance only shall be allowed or paid.”181 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Stanolind
when interpreting this provision, setoff was viewed as a privilege based on the
discretion of the court depending on equitable principles,182 but that was the only
restriction on the provision. In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Congress did not
limit setoff as later statutes would, and courts did not see a need to provide other
equitable principles to supplement this privilege.

175
Kings Terrace Nursing Home v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (In re Kings Terrace Nursing Home), 1995
Bankr. LEXIS 157, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1995), aff’d, 184 B.R. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
176
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012).
177
See The Honorable Thomas F. Waldron, Neil M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory
Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 214–15 (2007).
178
See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 92 F.2d 28.
179
Epstein, supra note 146, at 63.
180
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 68, 30 Stat. 544, 565 (repealed 1978) (superseded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1532).
181
Id.
182
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 92 F.2d at 32.
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The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 altered ideas about setoff by stating in § 553
that setoff is a right, not solely a privilege.183 Section 553 does not mention
recoupment. The right of setoff described in this section applied to mutual debts
that arose before the bankruptcy case commenced, and the Code does not
mention a difference between “mutual debts” and those that arise from the “same
transaction.”184 The Code also changed the previous law on setoff by including
a provision discussing it in § 362. Currently, § 362 places a limitation on the
right of setoff while the automatic stay is in place, but it does not mention the
possibility of subverting this limitation by utilizing recoupment instead.185 There
was also no mention of recoupment in the Code’s legislative history to guide
courts.186 Even when Congress amended the Code in 2005 through the
BAPCPA, there was no amendment that addressed recoupment. Since Congress
did not codify recoupment when it amended the Code, courts could conclude
that Congress intended to allow courts to prescribe recoupment’s parameters.
However, courts must also be aware of the idea that the non-statutory doctrines
must be narrowly construed with provisions of the Code.187
The bankruptcy system is known as a statutory system that prescribes clear
and standard rules for bankruptcy proceedings, but courts also have jurisdiction
in some cases to protect equity. These two ideas can clash when attempting to
provide some debtors with more flexible tools for reorganization than the Code
strictly allows.188 By allowing broad judicial discretion for non-statutory
doctrines, it becomes a separation of powers issue because the unelected
judiciary is changing the laws made by the elected legislature.189 While all
judicial activism cannot be considered a violation of separation of powers,
judicial interpretation of non-statutory doctrines should, at least, be narrowly
limited to preserve the goals of the bankruptcy process.190

183

Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 553 (1978); see also 11 U.S.C. § 553

(2012).
184
See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1978). The “same transaction” distinction for debts arose from the common law,
not statute. See Lee, 739 F.2d at 875.
185
See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 362 (1978); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362
(2012).
186
See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977); 151 Cong. Rec. S1726-01 (2005).
187
See In re McMahon, 129 F.3d at 97; In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
188
See Adam J. Levitin, Toward A Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2006).
189
See id. at 15.
190
Contra id. at 4 (advocating for broader judicial discretion to create a federal common law that expands
on the Code).
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Even if courts determine that recoupment is a separate equitable doctrine
from setoff, there may be cause for distinguishing recoupment’s use in
bankruptcy cases.191 In In re Malinowski,192 the Second Circuit seemed to imply
that recoupment should be applied differently in bankruptcy cases than in other
types of cases to protect bankruptcy’s goal of equal distribution among
creditors.193 In that case, the New York Department of Labor withheld
unemployment insurance benefits from a debtor who filed bankruptcy to recover
prepetition overpayments of unemployment benefits.194 After the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, the Department of Labor determined the debtor was eligible for
benefits, but withheld those benefits to recover payments that had previously
been overpaid to the debtor without filing a claim in the bankruptcy case or
seeking relief from the automatic stay.195
While the bankruptcy court and district court held that the Department’s
actions were permissible under recoupment, the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that recoupment could not be allowed because the prepetition payments
and post-petition payments were not part of the same transaction.196 The Second
Circuit described setoff according to the Code’s definition, but acknowledged
that recoupment was not subject to the same limitations as setoff and described
the doctrine instead as “a defense, the purpose of which is to do justice viewing
one transaction as a whole.”197
In defining “transaction,” the Second Circuit rejected the broad definitions
used by other courts and instead explained that recoupment and “transaction” in
bankruptcy should be “given a more restricted definition.”198 The court rejected
the Department’s arguments that there was a contractual relationship that
allowed it to withhold these payments when the payments came from separate
periods of unemployment.199 In Malinowski, the Second Circuit presented a
good argument for limiting the non-statutory doctrine of recoupment in
bankruptcy cases that focused on providing an equitable remedy based on the
facts of the case and upholding Congress’s goals for the Code.200

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

See Epstein, supra note 146, at 64.
Malinowski v. N.Y. Sate DOL (In re Malinowski), 156 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 134.
See id. (holding that the goals behind the Code be maintained to limit recoupment).
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It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Reiter v.
Cooper201 did anything to clarify this argument on whether bankruptcy cases for
recoupment should be treated differently than those outside of bankruptcy. In
Reiter, the bankruptcy trustee brought an action against the bankrupt company’s
shipping partner to recover freight shipping undercharges.202 The issue in Reiter
focused on the procedure for bringing counterclaims and recoupment claims.203
The Court explained that the debtor can utilize recoupment to satisfy
counterclaims and used a footnote to inform that recoupment in this case was
not distinguishable because it was a bankruptcy case.204 This footnote has been
considered as the Court’s way of rejecting the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Malinowski regarding treating recoupment differently within bankruptcy.205
Others argue that the Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning enough to
come to that conclusion.206 In Reiter, the Supreme Court pointed to Bankruptcy
Rule 7013207 and its incorporation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13208 for
support.209 However, the issue with using Bankruptcy Rule 7013 is that the Court
did not consider the exception in the rule for claims that arise after the entry of
an order for relief or filing of a petition.210 The exception is supposed to
distinguish post-petition claims that should not be considered counterclaims
from the prepetition claims that can.211 Because the Supreme Court did not
discuss this exception, some argue the opinion left room for distinguishing
claims within bankruptcy from those outside due to the important distinction
between prepetition and post-petition claims within bankruptcy proceedings.212
There is also a possibility that Reiter has no substantive significance for the topic
of recoupment in bankruptcy. The Court’s statement could have solely been
about the insignificance of the procedural background of the case, where the
defendant attempted to assert recoupment as a defense instead of a
counterclaim.213 What is clear is that the Supreme Court did not go further to
rule on the definition of “same transaction.”
201

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993).
Id. at 261.
203
See id. (determining that there was an issue of time within the procedure).
204
Id. at 265 n.2.
205
See In re Malinowski, 156 F.3d at 134 (2d Cir. 1998); Epstein, supra note 146, at 54.
206
See Averch, supra note 70, at 300.
207
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7013.
208
FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
209
Reiter, 507 U.S. at 265 n.2.
210
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7013; 11 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2012) (“The commencement of a voluntary case under a
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such a chapter.”).
211
Averch, supra note 70, at 300.
212
See id. at 300.
213
See Roest, supra note 174, at 41.
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In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit stated that recoupment was
a non-statutory doctrine that should be narrowly construed.214 Narrowly
construing recoupment must also be balanced with the pre-Code practices
doctrine. In Cohen v. de la Cruz,215 the Supreme Court explained the pre-Code
practices doctrine by stating that the Court does not interpret the Code as
“erod[ing] past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress
intended such a departure.”216 The pre-Code practices doctrine represents the
Court’s belief that Congress legislated the Code knowing certain pre-Code
practices existed, and Congress could have clearly changed those practices
through the Code.217 Since Congress only discussed setoff in the Code and not
recoupment, courts are able to utilize the doctrine for equitable purposes, but
recoupment should not be expanded too broadly.
Although the pre-Code practices doctrine may be helpful when determining
whether Congress intended to displace a non-statutory practice, such as
recoupment, such an assumption would not prohibit courts from imposing
limitations on the doctrine. In United States v. Texas,218 the Supreme Court
stated “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles,
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”219 Here, the State of
Texas asserted that the United States Department of Agriculture attempted to
recover a debt along with prejudgment interest from the State for loss of food
stamp coupons.220 The State argued that the Debt Collection Act of 1982
precluded the federal government from recovering prejudgment interest from
states.221 The Supreme Court ruled against Texas and held that the common law
principle of prejudgment interest must still be in place because the statute had
not spoken directly to abrogating it.222 Some commentators use this case to claim
that a statute cannot modify any area of common law unless it speaks to it
directly.223 This idea is then imported to how one analyzes the Code and the
common law doctrine of recoupment. The issue with using the pre-Code
214

In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
216
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. at 221 (1998) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S.
552, 563 (1990)).
217
Levitin, supra note 188, at 59.
218
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
219
Id. at 534.
220
Id. at 530–31.
221
Id. at 530.
222
See id. at 536.
223
See Elizabeth Swinton Schoen & Samuel R. Maizel, The Medicare Contract in Bankruptcy: In Which
Direction Does University Medical Center Lead?, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 405, 421 (1995).
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practices doctrine in the context of recoupment is that the Code is not seeking to
abrogate it. The goals of the Code may have implications that limit the doctrine
of recoupment, but United States v. Texas does not provide any instructions on
how this type of conflict should be resolved.
The common law also never discussed the appropriate way to construe a
common law doctrine whose practical significance is diminishing in the areas it
was originally intended to be utilized. Recoupment was significant outside of
bankruptcy for procedural reasons when distinguishing counterclaims from
defenses.224 Currently, most of those requirements for pleadings are no longer
useful inside or outside of bankruptcy.225 Recoupment’s lingering significance
is determining whether a claim will be subject to the automatic stay, but it is not
clear whether the doctrine was intended for this purpose. In Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers,226 the Supreme Court stated that the equitable powers
bankruptcy courts possess are limited by the provisions in the text of the Code.227
By using the single integrated transaction test to determine which claims arise
within the same transaction, courts allow recoupment as a pre-Code practice
without expanding the doctrine so far that it becomes inequitable in some
situations.228
Additionally, limiting recoupment by using the single integrated transaction
test would not harm these creditors as much as many would like to believe. If a
court denies a creditor the ability to recoup its debt because the transactions are
not connected enough to fall within the definition of “same transaction,” the
creditor will simply have a right to setoff instead of recoupment. Under setoff,
creditors may realize they do not have immediate access to the claimed property,
but setoff simply places them in the same or better position than other creditors.
A creditor’s right to setoff would be stayed under § 362 of the Code but within
the bankruptcy process, the creditor may be treated like a secured creditor.229 As
a secured creditor, the creditor may not be able to get their property before
everyone else, but the creditor does have more say in the chapter 11 plan process

224

Roest, supra note 174, at 46.
See id. at 73.
226
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
227
Id. at 206 (“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
228
See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
229
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
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than a general unsecured creditor.230 Alternatively, the creditor could petition a
court for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) of the Code.231
B. Using the Single Integrated Transaction Test in Healthcare Cases
The minority test, or single integrated transactions test, limits the doctrine of
recoupment enough to allow equitable relief in appropriate circumstances while
furthering the public policy goals of bankruptcy and healthcare laws. In contrast,
the logical relationship test embraced by the majority, which only requires
claims be connected by a “logical relationship,” expands recoupment too
broadly.232 Under the logical relationship test, the court in In re TLC Hospitals,
Inc. admitted that the test could be construed to encompass numerous claims
solely linked by one commercial relationship.233 The court cautioned against
allowing the doctrine to expand this far but failed to prescribe any additional
guidelines to stop this from occurring.234 If recoupment is allowed to expand too
broadly, the doctrine may displace the Code’s provisions regarding setoff and
disturb the equality of the chapter 11 process.
1. Cases from Other Industries
Alternatively, the single integrated transactions test will not drown out
recoupment or the goals of bankruptcy, but similar approaches have been used
in a manner that allows certain debtors the fresh start bankruptcy intends to
provide them. In In re B & L Oil Co.,235 the Tenth Circuit allowed a buyer to
recoup overpayments from the payments it owed a supplier prior to
bankruptcy.236 In this case, the Tenth Circuit stated its belief that recoupment
should apply in narrow situations, but here, the court found this situation to be
sufficiently narrow.237 The court in In re B & L Oil Co. dealt with a clear contract

230
“To obtain confirmation, or ‘cramdown,’ of a [c]hapter 11 plan over the dissent of a secured creditor,
the debtor generally has to provide for a stream of payments (such as through a promissory note) such that (1)
the present value of the payment stream is at least equal to the value of the collateral and (2) the total payments
will at least equal the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).” See Averch, supra note 70,
at 292.
231
A creditor may be granted relief from the automatic stay if able to show (1) cause, “including the lack
of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest” or (2) showing the debtor does not
have an equity in the property, and it is not needed for reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2012).
232
In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1012.
233
Id.
234
See id.
235
In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155.
236
Id. at 159.
237
Id. at 157.
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that the parties entered for a product, and the buyer sought to recoup amounts
from the previous month’s exchange.238 The Tenth Circuit allowed recoupment
because it believed allowing the debtor to keep those amounts would be unjust
enrichment.239
Also, in In re Beeche Systems Corp.,240 a bankruptcy court allowed
recoupment even after accepting the narrow “single integrated transactions”
approach.241 In this case, the buyer and seller had a contract prior to the seller
filing bankruptcy.242 The buyer deducted the amount it owed the seller from the
amount the seller owed the buyer for repurchasing equipment.243 The bankruptcy
court allowed recoupment in this situation because it was clear from the terms
of the contract that each party’s claim was from one transaction regarding the
same equipment.244 Courts are able to utilize narrow tests, like the single
integrated transactions test, to determine when recoupment is equitable without
broadening the doctrine.
Recoupment in healthcare and the Medicare industry is substantially
different from these examples because of the contractual relationships.
Arguably, Medicare provider agreements create contractual relationships
between the government and the healthcare provider.245 Though a contractual
relationship could make healthcare cases similar to cases like In re B & L Oil
Co., the courts that allow recoupment under the logical relationship test based
their opinions on the Medicare statute language that allows HHS to determine
payments subject to pre-petition overpayment claims.246 Not only are courts
unclear on whether the relationship is contractual or statutory, but they also do
not take into account the nature of the agreements. Medicare provider
agreements also are unique because CMS does not allow contractual
negotiations on whether HHS will attempt to recoup from the provider during
bankruptcy, and if recoupment is not limited in other bankruptcy cases (though
it should be) the single integrated transaction test should especially be used in
healthcare cases.

238

See id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
240
In re Beeche Sys. Corp., 164 B.R. 12 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
241
See id. at 18.
242
See id. at 15.
243
Id. at 18.
244
See id.
245
See Schoen, supra note 223, at 409; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1988); In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224
F.3d at 1013.
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See In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013; Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395.
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2. The Single Integrated Transaction Test is the Best Method for
Healthcare and Government Cases
Healthcare entities and their provider agreements with CMS are
substantively different from commercial contracts. This is because these entities
are not only involved in providing important health services to the public, but
Medicare reimbursements are also made based on a prospective payment system
CMS designed.247 The single integrated transaction test is the best method for
determining whether Medicare overpayment claims should be considered
recoupment. In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit did not allow CMS
to recoup overpayments from a medical provider because the claims arose from
different transactions for different services and products.248 The Third Circuit
believed CMS’s overpayment claim was distinct from the reimbursements
because the overpayments were only within the same transaction as the
reimbursements in the same year, and CMS could not recoup overpayments from
reimbursements from the following year.249
In a previous case decided by the Third Circuit, Lee v. Schweiker, the court
also denied a government entity the right to recoup pre-petition overpayments.250
In Lee, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) overpaid elderly benefits to
an individual, but the individual filed for bankruptcy during the time SSA was
attempting to recover the overpayments by reducing the individual’s monthly
benefits.251 The Third Circuit decided that these benefits could not be recouped
from an individual because they were similar to the individual’s income, unlike
a claim or contractual right.252 The court held that SSA could keep the payment
it recouped prior to the individual filing for bankruptcy, but by withholding postpetition benefits, SSA violated the automatic stay because its actions were not
recoupment.253
In University Medical Center, the Third Circuit based its decision on
whether the Medicare payments and overpayments were within the same
transaction by examining the Medicare reimbursement process. Medicare’s
unique reimbursement process for healthcare entities should be considered
because Medicare established the reimbursement procedures, and courts should
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

See generally Prospective Payment Systems, supra note 30.
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
Id. at 1081–82.
See Lee, 739 F.2d at 876.
Id. at 872.
See id. at 876.
Id.
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enforce those procedures. Medicare uses cost reporting to help determine the
amount of Medicare funds the healthcare entity should receive.254 Cost reporting
requires the healthcare provider to submit a standard CMS cost report form
annually for each fiscal year.255 The cost report requests various information on
the facilities’ operations, costs, and financial statement data.256 CMS also gives
providers certain reporting principles to follow when completing these forms,
such as requiring use of generally accepted accounting principles, unless an
alternative policy is given.257
Medicare specifically requires that cost reporting periods align with the
facility’s twelve-month fiscal year.258 Medicare holds healthcare entities to these
policies and their cost reports by only allowing limited amendments to submitted
reports under certain circumstances.259 When submitting the cost reports, an
entity’s administrator or chief financial officer must certify that the report is
accurate and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.260 Then,
Medicare turns the cost report file over to a Medicare Administrative Contractor
(“MAC”) to review and audit it.261 CMS tasks various MACs with performing
audits at the site of the healthcare entity or as a “desk review,” and following the
audit they must reconcile and settle the reimbursements for the period.262
The courts in University Medical Center and Lee v. Schweiker made their
decisions about whether the claims arose out of the same transaction by
examining the facts and characteristics of the claims presented.263 The single
integrated transaction test’s narrow interpretation of “same transaction” is
necessary in bankruptcy cases that involve long, complex transactions, like those
in healthcare and other cases involving the government. Courts should also
254

See 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 (2017).
Id. § 413.20.
256
Id. § 413.24.
257
Id. § 413.20.
258
Id. § 413.24.
259
Id. § 413.24; see also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT
MANUAL–PART I (PUB. 15-1), CH. 29, § 2931.2(A), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/
Manuals/Paper-Based-Manuals-Items/CMS021929.html?DLPage=1&DLEntries=10&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=
ascending (“Ordinarily, a cost report filed in a manner consistent with regulations and policy governing its
preparation is intended to be final when settlement has been made or following an audit when determined to be
necessary by the intermediary . . . . However, a cost report may also be considered final when initially delivered
to the intermediary although the intermediary may not have performed its desk review and, if necessary, its
audit.”)
260
42 C.F.R. § 413.24 (2017).
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1080–82; Lee, 739 F.2d at 876.
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narrowly construe “same transaction” in cases with government agencies
because the Bankruptcy Code has already provided special provisions for these
agencies.264 The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides an
exception for governmental agencies to enforce their police and regulatory
power.265 When these agencies attempt to enforce contractual rights, they
remove themselves from the protection of this exception, allowing the courts to
treat them as all other creditors.266
The Third Circuit in University Medical Center held that Medicare’s claim
to recover overpayments did not arise out of the same transaction because of the
Medicare payment process.267 The court examined the Medicare payment
system and its process of reconciling its records on an annual basis.268 The Third
Circuit was able to conduct this type of examination because CMS and other
regulatory agencies have manuals and rules that prescribe how the agency must
handle certain actions.269 If agencies are going to promulgate specific
regulations, the agency must also expect courts to hold them to those standards
when interpreting other doctrines.
The Third Circuit’s decision in University Medical Center was focused
around the audit system, but it also referred to the services from the period when
the overpayments were made and those services from the post-petition period
when the reimbursements were held as distinctly different services.270 HHS
argued the reporting and auditing period centered around the fiscal year was used
for administrative convenience.271 In Consumer Health Services, the D.C.
Circuit agreed with that argument and described the audit only as a “snapshot in
time,”272 but this statement contradicts the strictness of CMS’s policies on cost
reporting for the fiscal year. By embracing this idea, the D.C. Circuit and other
courts make the entire term of the Medicare provider agreement one
transaction.273 This distinction is too broad because CMS’s recoupment actions
can never be checked by the courts, despite the D.C. Circuit’s statements
264

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012).
See id.
266
See In re Coporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 805 F.2d at 445; In re Univ. Med.
Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1075.
267
Id. at 1081.
268
Id.
269
See, e.g., Eligibility, and Entitlement, supra note 28, at § 10.1; Medicare Financial Management
Manual, supra note 33, at Ch. 3, § 20.1.
270
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081.
271
Id. at 1080.
272
Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 395.
273
Roest, supra note 174, at 73.
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otherwise.274 When the bankruptcy court examined the Medicare provider
agreement in University Medical Centers,275 it pointed to the provision that
stated HHS’s reimbursements were for each eligible patient that the hospital
treated.276 When the Third Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s decision, it
took into account that each patient may have different services provided to them,
but HHS chose to keep track of the services rendered within a certain transaction
through the reporting and auditing procedure.
C. Effects on Healthcare Entities
In the healthcare industry, efficient reorganization can have a significant
effect on public health.277 When healthcare entities are not given the adequate
resources to reorganize, they may be forced to close their doors to patients.278
Medicare reimbursements are a necessary tool of reorganization for many
healthcare providers. Courts and the government should also consider how limits
placed on recoupment can assist the goals of health law.279 In Lee v. Schweiker,
the Third Circuit acknowledged the argument that government benefits to
individuals may warrant a special consideration when deciding whether a
government agency may recoup overpayments during bankruptcy.280 The single
integrated transactions test, as used in Lee and University Medical Center, takes
into account the special circumstances of healthcare and government agency
cases when determining how broadly the courts should define “same
transaction.”281
A unique issue for healthcare entities is their obligation to continue servicing
a patient once their staff begins treating him.282 Under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), if a patient enters the
emergency department of a hospital with an emergency medical condition, the
hospital is required to at least screen and stabilize the patient.283 EMTALA
prohibits hospitals from “dumping” patients on other emergency departments
274
Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d at 396 (“We do not hold, however, that all Medicare
claims for prior overpayments avoid the automatic stay. A provider that is no longer providing Medicare
services, whether or not it is in [c]hapter 11, is subject to a collection remedy defined by statute and regulation.”).
275
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 122 B.R. at 930.
276
Id.
277
See Palmer, supra note 6.
278
See, e.g., In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1071; In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. at 164.
279
See Palmer, supra note 6.
280
See Lee, 739 F.2d at 876.
281
See In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1081; Lee, 739 F.2d at 876.
282
See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2011).
283
Id.
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for discriminatory reasons, such as race, sexual orientation, or lack of
insurance.284 Physicians are also prohibited from discontinuing service to their
patients without going through a proper procedure to terminate the physicianpatient relationship and assist the patient in finding other services.285 Though the
costs for these services are supposed to be factored into Medicare’s payment
system, these special obligations could be a reason why in previous years
Medicare underpayments have totaled over $20 billion.286
It seems inequitable that one party may be allowed to recoup payments, but
the other party cannot discontinue services if the government breaches its
contractual obligation. After University Medical Center, the Third Circuit’s
decision could be read broadly enough to allow an entity to enforce a provider
agreement against the government but not perform its obligations.287 Under
§ 365 of the Code, an executory contract may be temporarily unenforceable
against the debtor in the time period before plan confirmation and assumption
or rejection of the contract.288 In those situations where the debtor could try to
take advantage of the creditor, creditors are also given a remedy under § 365(d)
to petition courts to require that the debtor assume or reject the contract.289 There
may also be other options for debtors attempting to hold the government
accountable for its actions. In Cosgrove v. Bowen,290 where individuals
attempted to recover interest for underpaid reimbursements, the Second Circuit
ruled that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not adjusting
reimbursement rates for some physician services, causing underpayments.291
D. Jurisdictional and Other Potential Issues
By prescribing such a broad test for determining the definition of “same
transaction,” the majority approach enables CMS to recoup Medicare
overpayments from healthcare entities despite the circumstances the entity may
be facing. CMS then has the right to recoup Medicare overpayments without
284
See id.; Thomas A Gionis, The International Tort of Patient Dumping: A New State Cause of Action to
Address the Shortcomings of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment Act (EMTALA), 52 AM. U. L. REV. 173,
181 (2002).
285
AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTING HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS
HANDBOOK, § 21.2.1 (Dinetia Newman & Robert G. Homchick, eds., 1st ed. 2016).
286
American
Hospital
Association,
Underpayment
by
Medicare
and
Medicaid
Fact Sheet, AHA (November 2009), http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/09medicunderpayment.pdf.
287
See Schoen, supra note 223, at 436–40.
288
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012); Dewey Freight Sys., Inc., 31 F.3d at 623.
289
11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (2012).
290
Cosgrove v. Bowen, 898 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1990).
291
Id. at 334.
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seeking relief from the automatic stay or coming to the bankruptcy courts.292
Without the automatic stay as a defense, a healthcare entity’s remedy is limited,
due to jurisdiction issues, to following through with the Medicare appeals
process.293 The same jurisdictional issue appeared in University Medical Center
when the case was brought to the court of appeals.294
In University Medical Center, HHS asserted that neither the court of appeals,
district court, or bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to rule on the claims.295 HHS
argued that those courts did not have jurisdiction to hear claims “arising under
the Medicare statute prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies” based on
language in the Medicare statute.296 The Third Circuit found that the
administrative channels were not exhausted, but it had jurisdiction under the
Code instead because the claim did not “arise under the Medicare statute.”297
The Third Circuit interpreted the statute to only implicate a jurisdictional issue
if the claim was over a disputed final reimbursement determination and if any
amounts were in dispute, unlike the facts in the case.298 Despite the court’s
somewhat shaky rationale, other circuits continued to rule on these claims based
on the same idea that they held jurisdiction.299 Most commentators believe that
University Medical Center left open whether courts may hear overpayment
claims prior to the provider exhausting its administrative remedies.300
Although University Medical Center did not start the confusion around 42
U.S.C. § 405(h) and its jurisdictional limitations for Medicare case, the Third
Circuit’s decision did not help clear things up. In 1984, when Congress amended
42 U.S.C. § 405(h), the amended statute was read to only limit district courts
from hearing claims arising under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.301 This
amendment sparked questions on whether § 405(h) also precluded bankruptcy
courts from hearing Medicare claims if the party has not exhausted all
administrative processes.302 Then, in Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life
292

In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d at 159.
In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d at 1326–27.
294
See In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065.
295
Id. at 1072.
296
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 1395ii (2012); In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1072.
297
In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1072.
298
Id. at 1073.
299
See, e.g., Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108 F.3d 390; In re TLC Hosps., Inc., 224 F.3d at 1013.
300
See Roest, supra note 174, at 56.
301
Id. at 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 addresses federal question jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 grants federal
district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for certain cases in which the United
States is the defendant.
302
Roest, supra note 174, at 58–60.
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& Cas.,303 a home health agency (“HHA”) brought an action against its fiscal
intermediary for causing it to lose HHA claims, leading to the loss of a
substantial amount of funds.304
The lower court, in Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc., granted the fiscal
intermediary’s motion to dismiss, but the HHA appealed.305 The Seventh Circuit
ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded the courts from jurisdiction over an
action brought by HHA against a fiscal intermediary.306 The court ruled that it
was precluded from jurisdiction, subject to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies because “Congress clearly expressed its intent not to alter the
substantive scope of section 405(h).”307 Here, the Seventh Circuit utilized
congressional intent to determine the implications of the statute because the
plain meaning presented some ambiguity,308 but this decision did not do enough
to clear the ambiguity behind the jurisdictional issue.
In 2014, the jurisdictional issue reappeared in In re Bayou Shores,309 a case
in which CMS terminated the provider agreement of a skilled nursing facility
due to compliance problems.310 The nursing facility later filed bankruptcy, and
the bankruptcy court stayed CMS’s actions to terminate the provider
agreement.311 At the bankruptcy court, there were numerous issues raised about
whether the Medicare provider agreements could be assumed and recovery
actions stayed. When the jurisdictional issue was raised, the bankruptcy court
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction, despite the Medicare statute, under
28 U.S.C. § 1334, which gives bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over “all civil
proceedings arising under title 11.”312
By the time the case made its way up to the Eleventh Circuit, it was clear
that the jurisdictional issue had become more contentious. The Eleventh Circuit
held that courts do not have jurisdiction over cases regarding CMS and Medicare
claims before the party has completed the agency’s administrative appeals
process.313 In Bayou Shores, the Eleventh Circuit explained that claims arising
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313

Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Roest, supra note 174, at 59.
In re Bayou Shores, SNF, LLC, 525 B.R. 160.
Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
In re Bayou Shores SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d at 1326.
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under the Medicare Act are no longer limited to those claims based on monetary
disputes.314 The Eleventh Circuit based its decision on the language in the
Medicare statute, without also considering the results to healthcare entities.315
Restricting a debtor’s access to bankruptcy courts to stop Medicare overpayment
recovery actions will likely affect healthcare entities in bankruptcy, given that
healthcare entities have reported that these administrative proceedings can take
years to complete, which ties up funds needed during reorganization.316
Healthcare entities do not have many other options, outside of leaving the
Medicare system, which would also cause the entity’s financial demise. In the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re TLC Hospitals, the Ninth Circuit stated that
health providers that do not want to be subject to HHS’s recoupment actions
have the option to not provide Medicare services and leave the system.317 Here,
it does not seem the court considered the equities and circumstances of the case.
Medicare payments cover such a large percentage of payments to hospitals that
many cannot survive without them.318 In 2010, HHS data showed that Medicare
patients accounted for around thirty-five percent of patients in urban hospitals
and around forty-five percent of patients in rural hospitals.319
The survival of these entities hinges on whether Medicare decides to
demand repayment of all its overpayments at any particular point in time.320 As
the district court in University Medical Center pointed out, these providers rely
on Medicare for support and ultimately find themselves indebted to HHS for
thousands of dollars at no fault of their own.321 From HHS’s own data, it is
normal for healthcare providers to rely on Medicare for a large portion of its
funds,322 but when Medicare makes a mistake, the entity will suffer if Medicare
decides to demand payments from one of these providers. Without some of these
necessary tools, the goal of chapter 11 bankruptcy that seeks to allow debtors to
stay in business while attempting to reorganize will not be met. This means the
underlying idea that these businesses are better for society alive than dead will
not be followed for one of the most important industries in the nation.
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If these providers do not have the resources to reorganize, many of them will
be forced to close. While new healthcare regulations may prompt some closures,
hospitals especially needed in rural areas will be harmed the most because more
of their patients’ services are reimbursed through Medicare.323 One example is
the Nye Regional Medical Center closure in Tonopah, Nevada.324 The closure
of this medical center left the residents of this rural area over an hour’s drive
away from the closest emergency department.325 Without any facilities to handle
emergency situations, the health of residents may be jeopardized. Similar stories
were seen throughout the country in 2015, and these closures affect patients,
employees, and the entire public health.326
CONCLUSION
For over ten years, courts have been split on whether government actions
that seek to recover Medicare overpayments from bankrupt healthcare entities
will be stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362. Courts have sought to resolve this issue
by defining recoupment as “[a] counterclaim arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the one on which the original action is based,”327 but this
definition has only led to further confusion over the phrase “same transaction.”
Out of the two tests used to determine whether claims arise out of the same
transaction, the single integrated transaction test is the most suitable for the
healthcare industry and Medicare claims.
The single integrated transaction test narrowly construes the doctrine of
recoupment, which restricts certain creditors from advancing their claim before
others and disrupts bankruptcy’s goal of providing equal treatment of all
creditors. The healthcare and Medicare industries are unique and important to
our nation in providing citizens with efficient, affordable, and widely available
healthcare resources. CMS should not be able to recover overpayments during
bankruptcy without seeking relief from the automatic stay. This issue regarding
Medicare claims must be resolved to provide those healthcare entities in
bankruptcy with more tools for reorganization.
Though this issue has long been debated, the need for answers is becoming
increasingly urgent due to new court decisions on the procedures healthcare
323
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entities must follow to get their claims heard. In In re Bayou Shores SNF, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a healthcare facility must adjudicate its complaints
about Medicare through the agency’s administrative process prior to bringing
the claim to the courts, including bankruptcy courts.328 This means that
healthcare entities will have a more difficult time getting a court to hear its
claims before it is too late for the entity to survive.
By allowing the government agency to jump other creditors in the
bankruptcy process and restricting courts from reviewing their actions for
numerous months, it gives HHS too much control. These procedures ignore the
importance of the automatic stay and giving the debtor the necessary “breathing
room” to reorganize. Under the ACA, future healthcare plans, and other
healthcare regulations, assistance from the courts will be needed to achieve the
legislature’s goal of increasing public health and efficient care.
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